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ABSTRACT 
Family homelessness is a long-lasting social problem and causes widespread concerns 
in the United States and throughout the world. Substantial efforts have been made to lift 
the homeless families out of the vulnerable situation and into opportunities. Despite that 
the outcomes of these efforts were very remarkable, it is argued that the population size 
of the hidden homeless families (HHF) - families living temporarily in someone else’s 
residences - are growing. These HHF have not received enough attention from the 
public and, therefore, lack resources to overcome the housing difficulty. In this study, 
by focusing on the City of Fort Collins, Colorado, I applied the System Dynamics 
Modelling approach in order to 1) unravel the factors that resulting in the growing 
number of HHF, 2) predict possible changes of the HHF population size in the future 
under the “business-as-usual” scenario and the “budget-reduction” scenario, and 3) 
propose feasible strategies in the form of a policy model to address the problem. The 
results suggested that the increase of the stock of HHF can attributed to the unbalance 
between its total outflow (mainly constrained by the capacity of the assistance programs, 
especially the availability of the housing choice vouchers and the number of landlords 
willing to participate in the assistance program) and its total inflow (mainly influenced 
by the number of evicted families that resulted from the rent burden and the adverse 
events for individuals). The number of HHF was predicted to increase at the same level 
under the two scenarios, but the second scenario is expected to have more pronounced 
effect on the families that are receiving vouchers. Based on the behaviour analysis, a 
particular strategy, increasing available vouchers by raising private funds, were 
designed in the model with a “wishful thinking” link to “connect the desired flow with 
the target flow”, and simulation results suggested that the HHF number will decrease as 
a result of the implementation of the strategies. This study concludes with a discussion 
of the implications for relevant public policies.  
Keywords: system dynamics, hidden family homelessness, tenant-based housing choice 
vouchers, federal budget cuts   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Background Information 
Homelessness is a long-lasting social problem and causes widespread concerns in the 
United States and throughout the world. When mentioned the homeless, most people 
may stereotype them as people sleeping and panhandling on the streets, wearing tattered, 
and experiencing substance abuse or mental illness. It is true that some homelessness, 
especially the chronical ones, fit this stereotype, but most of them are actually not. One 
representative of these non-obvious homelessness is the families with children, which 
typically refer to those households consist of at least one adult and one child under the 
age of 18 “lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence”.  
1.1.1 What is the number of homeless families?  
Family homelessness is a fast growing group of the homelessness population. 
According to the Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) based on the one-night 
Point-in-Time count (PIT), the number of people in homeless families represent over 
one-third of the total homeless population (Henry et al., 2016). These homeless families 
are no different from poor families but just have no roof over their heads (M Shinn, 
2009; M. B. Shinn, Rog, & Culhane, 2005).  
1.1.2 How do families become homeless?  
Several reasons have been suggested to lead to the homelessness. Wolch, Dear, and 
Akita (1988) concluded that the five most common causes of homelessness are eviction, 
discharge from an institution, loss of a job, personal crisis (including divorce or 
domestic violence), and removal of monetary or nonmonetary welfare support. Gould 
and Williams (2010) illustrated that family homelessness is a consequence of poor 
economic conditions and insufficient social welfare supports. Hartman & Robinson 
(2003) and Wood-Boyle (2015) argued that the tenant eviction, mostly due to the 
nonpayment of rent, is highly related to homelessness. Brush, Gultekin, and Grim (2016) 
argued that domestic violence is one of the primary causes of housing instability and 
homelessness for many people especially women and girls. There are also several 
studies pointed out that the lack of affordable housing1 is one of the most dominant 
factors leading to homelessness in the United States (Marybeth Shinn & Weitzman, 
1994; Marybeth Shinn et al., 1998).  
                                                
1 In general, housing is considered affordable if it costs no more than 30 percent of a household's income. 
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For children in the homeless families that have to move frequently, the unstable and 
overcrowded living situation always means a disruption of their routines as well as their 
relationships with teachers and friends and have long-term negative effects on these 
children when they transition to adulthood (Park, Metraux, & Culhane, 2005; Schmitz, 
Wagner, & Menke, 2001).  
1.1.3 What efforts can help the homeless families? 
Substantial efforts have been made to lift those homeless families with children out of 
the vulnerable situation and into opportunities. Homeless shelters are places providing 
beds and foods to avoid those homeless families staying on the streets, and this measure 
was proven to be not cost-effective (Letiecq, Anderson, & Koblinsky, 1998). Rent 
assistance and project-based transitional housing were designed to give those families 
short-term assistance and relevant services to help them overcome the housing crisis 
(2002). For long-term solutions, there are some existing programs designed to support 
these families, such as the housing subsidy mainly in the form of the Housing Choice 
Vouchers (HCV), and the community-based rapid rehousing and the permanent 
supportive housing (Gubits et al., 2015). Among these programs, the HCV program is 
proven to be one of the most effective interventions (Gubits et al., 2015; Sard, 2001).  
The HCV program, formally known as Section 8, is the largest rental assistance 
program of the federal government (Ellen, Center, & Wagner, 2017). There are two 
different types of HCV in the United States: one is the tenant-based vouchers (TBV) 
and the other is the project-based vouchers (PBV). Both TBV and PBV are 
government-funded programs that provide subsidy to low-income households in 
privately owned rental housing. Families with TBV or PBV just need to pay ~30% of 
their income for the housing rent, and the vouchers will pay the rest. The difference is 
the portability of the vouchers. The TBV subsidy is tied to the voucher holder, the 
assistance is portable, meaning it may be used within the jurisdiction where the family 
lives or within any jurisdiction with an HCV program, while the PBV subsidy is tied to 
the building, meaning families moving out of a housing will loss the rental assistance.  
The HCV program was demonstrated to be very effective in reducing family 
homelessness in the US. For example, Wood et al. (2008) concluded that the HCV 
dramatically reduced homelessness, crowding, household size, and the incidence of 
living with relatives or friends, and resulted in small improvements in neighborhood 
quality. Similarly, Gubits et al. (2015) suggested that the families received the HCV 
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experienced less homelessness than those offered other assistances. In addition, this 
work also revealed that families assigning HCV resulted in significant reductions in 
child separations, domestic violence, psychological distress, food insecurity, and school 
mobility. Although both the TBV and the PBV have positive impacts, there are some 
evidence suggesting that the TBV is more effective than the PBV and is the most 
prevalent form of housing assistance provided. For example, Turner (1998) concluded 
that the TBV offers better locational outcomes than the PBV because the TBV 
supplements what low-income families and individuals can afford to pay for housing in 
the private market. This assistance can help poor families move out of distressed inner-
city neighborhoods to neighborhoods that offer better opportunities and quality of life. 
1.2. Problem Formulation 
1.2.1 The Ignored Hidden Family Homelessness 
As a result of efforts mentioned above, achievements were very remarkable toward 
ending family homelessness (Khadduri, 2008). According to the PIT count, many 
programs were put into practice and the number of homeless families decreased these 
years as a consequence (Henry et al., 2016). However, it is argued that such one-night 
count underestimates the number of homeless families because it is only cover the 
families that are temporarily sheltered and that are living on streets and a larger amount 
of families is hidden from the public attention (Brush et al., 2016). This argument was 
supported by numerous studies showing that most at-risk or homeless families seek 
informal shelters (i.e. double-up and move frequently through unstable housing 
situations), and shelters are taken as their last resort only if they run out of their social 
network (Brush et al., 2016; Elliott, Young, & Dye, 2011; Mihaly, 1991; Marybeth 
Shinn, Knickman, & Weitzman, 1991; Simmons, 2017). These families are called the 
hidden homeless families (HHF) - families living temporarily in someone else’s 
residence - and are as vulnerable as those in emergency shelters (Watson, Crawley, & 
Kane, 2016). 
Because of the difficulty to pinpoint neither the magnitude of the general hidden 
homeless families nor the families with children, we still do not have a complete figure 
of them (Brush et al., 2016; Mihaly, 1991). However, we could estimate a big number 
for them based on some indirect data sources. In the United States, the National 
Alliance to End Homelessness reworked the data released from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 2014 and estimated that about 7 million 
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people in poor households living doubled-up in 2014, while only about 640,000 people 
were surveyed in that year’s PIT count, and the number has been increasing since 2005, 
as shown in Fig. 1-1 (The state of homelessness in America, 2016).  
                          
Fig. 1-1. The number of people living doubled-up and the number of total homeless population 
surveyed in the PiT count in the US, 2009-2016. Source: the data were retrieved from the State of 
Homelessness in America (2016), while no data are available regarding the number of people living 
doubled-up in the year of 2015 and 2016.  
In order to get deeper understanding about the dynamics of the HHF population, I 
selected the City of Fort Collins (FC) in the state of Colorado, US as the main study 
area of this thesis. FC is located in Northern Colorado and is the most populous 
municipality of Larimer County. It is a mid-sized college city with a 2016 estimated 
population of 164,207 (data retrieved from American Fact Finder 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF) 
and is home to Colorado State University. FC ranks the 11th of the happiest city in 
America and attracts thousands of people selecting FC as their choice city (accessible at 
http://247wallst.com/special-report/2017/03/07/the-happiest-and-most-miserable-cities-
in-america-3/4/).  
Despite of its good reputation, the amount of HHF is also very considerable locally in 
FC. It is surprising to see that there is an above-average poverty rate in the city and 




              
Fig. 1-2. Individuals’ poverty rate and the rate of homelessness per 10,000 people in the US, in 
Colorado and in the City of Fort Collins. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2015, 2012-2016 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Homeward 20202, and the 2016 state of homelessness 
in America. Note: Data regarding the homeless rate in Fort Collins from 2009 to 2012 are not available 
yet. 
Based on the Homeless Education data3 released by the Colorado Department of 
Education for the McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Children and Youth 
(EHCY) Program, about 1110 school children were homeless among its total 
enrollments of 29,527 in the Poudre School District (PSD)4 in the 2015-16 school year, 
and about 80% of the homeless children are staying doubled-up with friends or other 
family members (CDE, 2016). This population size remained stable from 2009 to 2016. 
When excluding 13% of those who are unaccompanied and assuming an average of 1.7 
children per family, and adjusted by a 93% proportion of school children in FC, we 
could estimate that over 400 families annually are experiencing housing crises in FC 
(Fig. 1-3). This estimation is supported by the sharply increased caseloads (from 98 in 
the year of 2010 to 2,135 in 2016) of Matthews House that serves families and children 
at risk of becoming homeless in Colorado (Kyle, 2017a).  
                                                
2 Homeward 2020 is a community dedicated “to make homelessness rare, short-lived, and non-
recurring” in Fort Collins.  
 
3 Children and youth in doubled-up situations are considered homeless under the education definition 
only if they are sharing the housing of others due to loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar 
reason. 
4 PSD, the 9th largest school district in Colorado, encompasses several communities including Fort 
Collins, Laporte, Timnath, Wellington, Red Feather, Livermore, Stove Prairie, and parts of Windsor. 
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Fig. 1-3. Estimated number of homeless families in Fort Collins doubled-up due to economic 
hardship. Data Source: estimated from the Homeless Education data produced by the Colorado 
Department of Education (CDE, 2016).  
Despite these large numbers, the HHF have not received enough attention from the 
public, probably because of either their invisibility or their number is not included by 
HUD as a prerequisite to receive federal funds. Although doubled-up children and their 
families are considered homeless under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 
this only gives them equal right to education but not qualify them for funding from 
HUD. As a result, the HHF lack resources to overcome the housing difficulty (Brush et 
al., 2016; Mihaly, 1991). It is believed that without taking the HHF into account, it is 
unlikely for FC to meet its goal of ending homelessness by the year of 2020, because 
the HHF are the main sources of the most vulnerable and visible literally homeless 
families (LHF)5 (The state of homelessness in America, 2016).  
1.2.2. The federal budget cuts in the United States 
Aiming at “spending precious taxpayer dollars only on the highest priorities, and 
always in the most efficient, effective manner”, the Trump Administration announced 
the proposed 2018 Budget for HUD in May, 2017. Overall, the budget is 13.2% lower 
than the 2017 level (OMB, 2017). Based on the analysis of the Affordable Housing 
Online, the FC would lose $903,616 per year for HCV, which means 85 homeless 
families will be affected.  
In response to the budget cuts, several agencies planned to take strategies to make their 
ends meet. According to the research by the Affordable Housing Online, if these 
                                                
5 The literally homeless families define those families that lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime 
residence, meaning: (1) has a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not meant for 
human habitation; (2) is living in a publicly or privately operated shelter; (3) is exiting an institution 
where (s)he has resided for 90 days or less and who resided in an emergency shelter or place not meant 
for human habitation immediately before entering that institution. 
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reforms were implemented, it is possible that all households benefiting from the 
program would pay substantially more for housing, even though they would not lose 
their voucher completely. In FC, the tenant contributions of the voucher holders will be 
increased from 30% of income to 35%. In addition, tenants would not receive 
reimbursement for tenant-paid utilities.  
The deep federal budget cuts stirred up concern that these unanticipated cuts would 
devastate thousands of families and communities nationwide in several ways. Firstly, it 
will obviously downsize the capacity of HCV and dramatically decrease the number of 
new voucher receivers. Secondly, it is predicted to decrease the administrative expenses 
of the Public Housing Authorities (PHA) that in charge of the HCV issue and make the 
process slower. Thirdly, it will also reduce the willing of landlords to rent houses to 
voucher holders and, therefore, weaken the successful public-private partnership on 
which the program is based (CBPP, 2017; CITYLAB, 2017).  
Therefore, I believe it is necessary and urgent to have a clearer figure of the number of 
the HHF, unravel the factors leading to the increase of them and have a numerical 
understanding about how could the fund cuts on TBV influence the number of homeless 
families, and thus get better preparation for this change and allocate far greater, 
dedicated resources to lift them up. 
1.3 Research Questions 
In this study, by focusing on FC, I aimed to get more understanding about the following 
three questions:  
1) Why did the number of HHF increase over the past years?  
2) How will the number of the HHF change under the following scenarios? 
a. “Business-as-usual” scenario: the scenario when the HHF are not given enough 
attention as currently. 
b. “Budget-reduction” scenario: the scenario if the federal funding cuts come into effect. 
3) What are the feasible solutions to address the hidden family homelessness?  
The three questions could be presented by Fig. 1-4. 
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Fig. 1-4. A diagram of the three basic questions in the field of system dynamics (adaptation from 
Warren (2002)). Note: The problematic dynamic behavior is the increasing number of hidden homeless 
families. It serves as a reference mode for the modeling. Fig. 1-4 begins in the year 2009 and extends to 
the year 2025. The number of HHF from 2009 to 2016 was estimated from some indirect data, and the 
number from 2017 to 2025 is just an example. This time period seems reasonable given the funding 
allocation delay and the time-consumed landlord pool expansion process. 
 
2. METHODS 
As described in the Introduction section, family homelessness is a complex and 
dynamic systems problem that cannot be solved with static solutions. These problems 
require adaptive, real-time approaches to intervention and measurement. System 
dynamics (SD) is a computer simulation modeling method for understanding and 
alleviating complex systems that change over time. The method uses stocks, flows and 
feedback concepts to focus our attention on the endogenous feedback structures that 
give rise to the dynamic behavior in a system (Fig. 2-1), and uses a simulation model to 
illustrate behavior in that system (Ford, 2010; Sterman, 2000).  
 
 
Fig. 2-1. Simple stock and flow structure. Stocks represented by rectangles are the variables in which 
quantities accumulate over time. Flows represented by arrows and valves are the variables adding to or 







The SD approach provides a practical way to help policy makers gain insights into the 
dynamics of social problems. Basically, it involves two steps: 1) building and testing an 
explanatory model to explain the reasons for the problematic dynamic behavior of the 
system; and 2) designing and testing a policy model that could be integrated with the 
explanatory model to alleviate the problem (Wheat, 2010). 
In this study, a simulation model was built using the program of Stella Architect, 
version 1.5 from the Isee Systems Inc. I firstly presented structures with simple stocks 
and flows to have a grasp of the key factors leading to the increased trend of HHF in 
FC. Secondly, the model was tested both empirically and theoretically in order to 
represent the real system and gain more confidence in the underlying structures, and 
simulation results were analyzed to decipher why the model produced such behaviors. 
Thirdly, based on the validated structures, the simulation model was run under two 
scenarios to see how the number of HHF will change. Fourthly, two proposed strategies 
were designed in the model with “wishful thinking” link to “connect the desired flow 
with the target flow” (Wheat & Shi, 2011), and simulation results were analyzed to 
check if the number of HHF shows expected results of the proposed wishful thinking. 
Finally, this study ended with discussion about the policy implications.  
 
3. QUALITATIVE MODEL 
This part presents the qualitative assumptions regarding the three questions to be 
addressed. 
3.1 Why did the number of HHF increase? 
It is hypothesized that the stock of HHF is affected by five flows: the evicted families 
(EF) doubling up with relatives/friends, the HHF entering temporary shelters, the 
families in temporary shelters becoming HHF again (HHF repeating), the HHF 
receiving tenant-based vouchers and the HHF receiving other assistances (e.g. the 
transitional housing, the rapid re-housing, the project-based vouchers or the rental 
assistance). The two inflows (“EF doubling-up” and “HHF repeating”) add to the stock 
of HHF while the three outflows (“HHF entering shelters”, “TBV assisted HHF” and 
“HHF receiving other assistance”) are subtracted from the stock (Fig. 3-1). Therefore, 
to explain the behavior of the HHF population, I need to understand what causes a 




Fig. 3-1. Key stock and flows related to the reference mode. Note: The rectangle represents a stock of 
families, while the thick arrows and cloud symbols represent flows of families. 
3.1.1 What causes the “EF doubling-up” (inflow) to change? 
Given the reasons mentioned in the Introduction section and based on the relatively 
stable evictions shown in Fig. 3-2, I hypothesized that the inflow of “EF doubling-up” 
in FC is mainly affected by the stock of the evicted families. The stock of EF is mainly 
influenced by the number of cost-burdened families (CBF) that resulted from the 
stagnant wages and the rising housing price (Fig. 3-3).  
Fig. 3-2. Annual evictions and renter-occupied housing units in Larimer County.	   Data source: 
Colorado Judicial Branch Annual Statistical Report and the U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2015 American 
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. No data is available regarding the evictions in Larimer County 
from 2009 to 2012. The annual eviction rate that defined as the proportion of evictions to total renters 














Fig. 3-3. Changes in the median rent and median renter income in the City of Fort Collins, 2009-
2016. Note: The inflation-adjusted median monthly rent in FC increased slower than the inflation-
adjusted renters' median income from 2009 to 2010, then rent increased faster than the income from 2010 
to 2012. From 2012 to 2014, both increased at a similar speed. From 2014 to 2015, the income did not 
change a lot while the rent increased about 4%. From 2015 to 2016, the household income increased 
slightly faster than the housing cost. Source: the rate of change was calculated from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. During 
the years when housing costs increase faster than the household income, the rent took a bigger bite out of 
renters' monthly income, leaving less money for other expenses like car payments, health care, food and 
entertainment in recent years. As a result, more  renters in FC were forced to spend more than 30 percent 
of their income on rent, meaning they are living in places they can't comfortably afford (Ferrier, 2016) 
This hypothesis could be represented by the following structure (Fig. 3-4). 
Fig. 3-4. Key factors influence the inflow (“EF doubling up”) of the HHF stock. 
3.1.2 What causes the “HHF entering shelters” (outflow) and “HHF repeating” 
(inflow) to change? 
The “HHF entering shelters” could be controlled by many factors, e.g. the temporary 
shelter capacity, the willingness to move to shelters, the regulation of the shelters and so 
on. Considering the FC is committed to shelter every family with children either by 






















and the temporary shelters are not long-term solutions, the capacity of temporary 
shelters and details of all other factors were not explicitly considered in this study. The 
“HHF entering shelters” is set as proportional to the stock of HHF. The “HHF repeating” 
is thought to be influenced by the stock of literally homeless families and the average 
length-of-time in shelters. Increasing the length-of-time families are allowed to stay in 
the temporary shelters could reduce the stock of HHF, but it is not a long-term solution 
and, therefore, not explicitly considered. As shown in Fig. 3-5, the “yearly frac. of HHF 
entering shelters” and the “avg. length-of-time shelters” are exogenous parameters in 
this study (Fig. 3-5). 
                               
Fig. 3-5. Factors influence the “HHF entering shelters” and the inflow of “HHF repeating”. 
3.1.3 What causes the “TBV assisted HHF” and “HHF receiving other assistance” 
(outflows) to change? 
If there is no assistance to help the at-risk or homeless families, which means they have 
no chance to get rid of the vulnerable situation, the number of the HHF is expected to 
increase to an extremely high level. However, as mentioned in the Introduction section, 
there are various existing programs that could help the homeless families. Since the 
TBV program is proven to be the most effective (Gubits et al., 2015), I will pay more 
attention on the TBV program among all assistances.  
As shown in Fig 3-6, although the number of families receiving vouchers increased 
stably from 2009 to 2016, it is reported that the demand for housing vouchers far 
outnumbers its supply, and the door has been closed to those in need of a housing 
voucher in Fort Collins since 2004 (Kyle, 2015). This shortage reduces local agencies' 
















                              
Fig. 3-6. Number of total authorized vouchers and vouchers in use in Fort Collins. Data retrieved 
from https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/national-and-state-housing-fact-sheets-data. 
The number of TBV in use is not only affected by the number of vouchers but also by 
the amount of available rental units that are willing to accept the voucher (Fig. 3-7). In 
this study, the availability of the voucher units6 and the available TBV are endogenous 
in order to reveal some important feedback structures that are expected to be 
responsible for the behavior of the system.  
                                                               
Fig. 3-7. Factors influence the “TBV assisted HHF” and “HHF receiving other assistance”. 
To recreate the problem of increased HHF population, the total annual inflows must 
outweigh the total yearly outflows (Fig. 3-8). In order to answer the first question- why 
                                                
6 By “voucher units”, this study refers particularly to the rental housing of those landlords that are 


















the number of HHF increased over the past years- it is necessary to understand why the 
outflows were less than the inflows. To answer the second question- how the number of 
HHF population will change- we need to know the development of the inflows and the 
outflows under the two scenarios. To address the third question, we need to think about 
what factors could influence the inflows or the outflows. 
Fig. 3-8. Causal loop diagram (CLD) of family homelessness system highlighting the model’s 
essential feedback structure. Note: Arrows with add signs (+) indicate positive causal influences and 
arrows with minus signs (-) indicate inverse causal influences. B1, B2, and B3 represent balancing 
feedback loops and R1 denotes a reinforcing feedback loop. 
3.2 How will the number of HHF change under different scenarios? 
a. “Business-as-usual” scenario: 
It is hypothesized that, without new strategies, the rent burden, the adverse events, the 
lack of available vouchers and the short of voucher units will make the inflow larger 
than the outflow and thus increase the amount of HHF population.  
b. “Budget-reduction” scenario:  
Three potential effects of the federal budget cuts are discussed in this study. Firstly, the 
budget cuts will decrease the TBV capacity and thus reduce the issuable vouchers to the 
at-risk or homeless families; Secondly, it will reduce the administrative fee, as a result 
less money could be invested to expand the landlord pool; Thirdly, to address the 
funding shortfall, the Housing Catalyst7 is expected to reduce the subsidy standard. 
Although this strategy makes sure that the families who are living in the assisted 
housing will not lose their assistance, reducing the actual subsidy will lead to an 
increase in TBV tenants’ contribution of rent and lengthen their time of accessing the 
TBV. As a consequence, other families have to wait a longer time to be assisted.  
3.3 What feasible strategies could reduce the HHF population? 
Based on the above analyses, any policy that focus either on reducing the inflow of the 
                                                
7 The Housing Catalyst is the largest affordable housing developer and property management company 
















stock of HHF or on increasing the outflow of the stock is helpful. To decrease the 
number of HHF, the total outflow need be larger than the total inflow.  
3.4 Model Boundary 
Given the purpose of this study, by listing which variables are included endogenously, 
which are exogenous, and which are excluded from the model, a model boundary is set 
to help making decision about whether to consider a feedback loop in the model (Table 
1). 
Table 1. Model Boundary 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
Non-cost-burdened renter families Family renters growth Population 
Cost-burdened families Adjusted monthly income  Migration 
Evicted families EF Yearly eviction rate Unsheltered homelessness 
Hidden homeless families HHF Yearly frac. of EF entering shelters Domestic violence 
Literally homeless families LHF Yearly fraction of EF doubling up Shelter capacity 
 
Tenant-based Vouchers (TBV) Yearly frac. of HHF entering shelters Project-based HCV 
TBV tenants Avg. length-of-time shelters Unemployment 
Families on waitlist WF TBV administration time  Effect of TBV on work effort 
Eligible applicants EA Avg. housing searching time  TBV portability 
TBV holders  TBV allocation rate   
Landlord pool LP Landlord increasing  
Voucher units vacancy Proportion of LP withdrawing  
TBV reserves Yearly proportion applying for TBV  
Administration fee reserves Yearly proportion with no interest  
Renewal funding Yearly proportion of EA to WF  
Payment standard Cost-burden ratio  
Tenant rent Inflation rate  
Fair market rent (FMR)8   
 
4. QUANTITATIVE MODEL 
It is believed that, in order to understand what factors influence the inflows or the 
outflows of the stock of HHF, we need to understand more details regarding how HHF 
are turning to be homeless and how they can be assisted. In this section, the whole 
explanatory model was divided into five interacted sectors (Fig. 4-1): the homeless 
sector, the housing market sector, the voucher sector, the landlord sector, and the 
funding sector. The homeless sector and the housing market sector illustrate how HHF 
are turning to be homeless. The voucher sector, the landlord sector and the funding 
sector explain how they can be assisted. Specifically, the voucher sector introduces the 
                                                
8 The FMR is the 40th percentile of gross rents for typical, non-substandard rental units occupied by 
recent movers in a local housing market. It is established federally. 
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administration process of families in need applying, being issued and leasing up with 
the TBV; the landlord sector gives an introduction of the process of landlords being 
briefed, participating and withdrawing the TBV program; and the funding sector shows 
the process of subsidy funding and administrative fee incrementing and spending. Most 
important structures and formulations that are helpful to understand the model theory 
are presented and described sector by sector.  
                             
Fig. 4-1. Overview of the family homelessness system. 
4.1 The Homelessness Sector 
As shown in Fig. 4-2, this sector assumes six states of families before and after being 
homeless: 1) families living in renter-occupied housing units that are non-cost-burdened 
(NCBRF), 2) families with rental cost-burden (CBF), 3) families being evicted by 
landlords due to overcrowding or unable to pay rent (EF), 4) families doubling-up in 
other relatives or friends’ homes (HHF), 5) families living in temporary shelters (LHF), 
and 6) Families receiving voucher assistance (TBV tenants) or families receiving other 
assistances (OAF). At-risk or homeless families cycle continuously through the system 
for both “push” reasons (evictions, time limits on stays, or undesirable features of the 
places they are staying) and “pull” reasons (desirable features of other housing 
situations) (Fisher, Mayberry, Shinn, & Khadduri, 2014; Lee, 1966). In the following 


































 Fig. 4-2. Stock and flow structure representing the different states of renter families. Note: In this 
model, the cost-burdened families directly move to temporary shelters were excluded because the number 
is very small. And also, unsheltered families were not taken into account, because its amount is much 
smaller than other types of homeless families (Khadduri, 2008; Rossi, 1994; Vissing, 2015).  
Stock: Unassisted Yet Non-cost-burdened Renter Families (NCBRF) 
Fig. 4-3. Stock and flow structure of the unassisted yet non-cost-burdened renter-families. Note: 
circles mean factors and parameters influence families and thinner arrows indicate causal influence. 
𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹 = 𝑁𝑒𝑤	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑉𝑇	  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝑂𝐴𝐹	  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 −
𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹 0 	                             (1) 
This stock accumulates the difference between new renting, VT turnover, OAF turnover 
and NCBRF being cost-burdened. Initially NCBRF is equal to NCBRF (0).  






































































𝑁𝑒𝑤	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	  𝑛𝑒𝑤	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛          (2) 
The “New renting” denoting the annual increased number of families join the rental 
market. This number is affected by many factors, such as the housing vacancy rate, the 
migration or the economic condition. Considering the scope of this study, these factors 
are excluded. The “annual no. of new renter families with children” was set as an 
exogenous value.  
Outflow: NCBRF being cost-burdened 
𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹 ∗
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑                       (3) 
In HUD’s definition, families are considered as cost-burdened if they pay more than 30% 
of their income for rent. The “yearly proportion of NCBRF being cost burdened” is 
endogenously resulted from the system. 
The equations of the two inflows, “VT turnover” and “OAF turnover”, will be 
presented at the end of this sector. The “VT turnover” is given by (29), and the “OAF 
turnover” is given by (31).  
Stock: Cost-burdened Families (CBF) 
Fig. 4-4. Stock and flow structure of the cost-burdened families. 
𝐶𝐵𝐹 = 𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑	  – 𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 −































This stock accumulates the difference between families being cost-burdened, evicted 
and assisted. Initially CBF is equal to CBF (0).  
Inflow: NCBRF being cost-burdened is given by (3). 
Outflow: CBF being evicted 
𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐶𝐵𝐹                     (5) 
Some of the cost-burdened families will have to face the risk of being evicted by their 
landlords when they experience an adverse event like job loss or illness, and are unable 
to pay their rent.  
Outflow: TBV assisted CBF 
𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐶𝐵𝐹 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 ∗ 𝐶𝐵𝐹   (6) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁(JKKLMJNOLP	  QRS
QRS
; 1)         (7) 
If without any other help, and assuming the recent faster increase of the housing cost 
relative to the income (Fig. 3-3) continued, we could imagine that more and more 
families will be at-risk and homeless families will never be ended. However, both the 
federal and local government launched various programs to reduce its number. Among 
those programs, it has evidence that one of the most important measures for lifting 
family homelessness up is the Tenant-based Housing Choice Voucher (TBV) program. 
However, because of the limited allocation, only a part of the cost-burdened families is 
able to lease up with a voucher.  
Outflow: CBF receiving other assistance 
𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝐶𝐵𝐹 ∗
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒                (8) 
Stock: Evicted Families (EF)       
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Fig. 4-5. Stock and flow structure of the evicted families. 
𝐸𝐹 = 𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝐸𝐹	  𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑢𝑝 − 𝐸𝐹	  𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 −
𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐸𝐹 − 𝐸𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐸𝐹 0 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	         (9) 
This stock accumulates the difference between families being evicted, doubling up, 
entering shelters and assisted. Initially EF is equal to EF (0). 
Inflow: CBF being evicted is given by (5). 
Outflow: EF doubling up 
𝐸𝐹	  𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑢𝑝 = 𝐸𝐹 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐. 𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝐹	  𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑢𝑝               (10) 
Outflow: EF entering shelters 
𝐸𝐹	  𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝐸𝐹 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐.	  	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝐹	  𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠     (11) 
If without any assistance, those evicted families likely only have two choices: either 
doubling-up with their friends/relatives or moving to temporary shelters if available. 
Most families tend to choose doubling-up rather than shelters as their first choice unless 
they have no place but temporary shelters to go (Marybeth Shinn et al., 1991; Watson et 
al., 2016).  




































𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐸𝐹 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝐹         (12) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁(JKKLMJNOLP	  YS
YS
; 1)         (13) 
Similar to the CBF, a part of the evicted families is lucky to lease up with a voucher and 
get rid of the risk of being homeless. 
Outflow: EF receiving other assistance 
𝐸𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒 =
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝐹	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝐹                    (14) 
Again, only a proportion of the evicted families is lucky to receive other assistances.  
Stock: Hidden homeless families (HHF) 
Fig. 4-6. Stock and flow structure of the hidden homeless families. 
𝐻𝐻𝐹 = EF	  doubling	  up– 	  HHF	  entering	  shelters + HHF	  repeating −
TBV	  assisted	  HHF − HHF	  receiving	  other	  assistance 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐻𝐻𝐹 0 	           (15) 
accumulates the difference between EF doubling up, HHF entering shelters, HHF 
repeating, TBV assisted HHF and HHF receiving other assistance. Initially HHF is 
equal to HHF (0).  


































Outflow: HHF entering shelters 
𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝐻𝐻𝐹 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠	  	  	   (16) 
Doubling-up is not a stable situation for the HHFs. When they run out of their social 
network, they have to seek temporary shelters to go through this crisis.  
Inflow: HHF repeating 
𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = rsS
Jtu	  KvPuNw	  Lx	  NOyv	  zwvKNv{z	  
                               (17) 
where LHF denotes the literally homeless families. 
The temporary shelter is also not a stable living situation for the homeless families. 
After spending a maximum time in shelters, the homeless families have to move out 
and double-up again.  
Outflow: TBV assisted HHF 
𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐻𝐻𝐹 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐹   (18) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁(JKKLMJNOLP	  ssS
ssS
; 1)         (19) 
Outflow: HHF receiving other assistance 
𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒 =
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐹                  (20) 
With the help of the TBV program and other assistances, part of the hidden homeless 
families is able to move to stable housing.  
Stock: Perceived Hidden Homeless Families (Perceived HHF) 
                                                       
Fig. 4-7. Stock and flow structure of the perceived hidden homeless families. 











𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑	  𝐻𝐻𝐹 = ssS~v{MvOtv	  ssS
v{MvOtv	  NOyv
                           (22) 
Perceived HHF accumulates the difference between HHF and the Perceived HHF, with 
a certain perceive time. Initially, Perceived HHF is equal to Perceived HHF (0). 
Stock: Literally Homeless Families (LHF) 
Fig. 4-8. Stock and flow structure of the literally homeless families. 
𝐿𝐻𝐹 = 𝐸𝐹	  𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 −
𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐿𝐻𝐹 − 𝐿𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝐻𝐹 0 	           (23) 
This stock accumulates the difference between EF entering shelters, HHF entering 
shelters, HHF repeating, TBV assisted LHF and LHF receiving other assistances. 
Initially LHF is equal to LHF (0).  
Inflow: EF entering shelters is given by (11). 
Inflow: HHF entering shelters is given by (16). 
Outflow: HHF repeating is given by (17). 
Outflow: TBV assisted LHF 
𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐿𝐻𝐹 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐿𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝐻𝐹   (24) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐿𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁(JKKLMJNOLP	  rsS
rsS
; 1)         (25) 




































𝐿𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒 =
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐿𝐻𝐹	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐿𝐻𝐹                   (26) 
Similarly, some literally homeless families that either lease up with the vouchers or 
receive other assistances can move to stable housing.  
Stock: Perceived Literally Homeless Families (Perceived LHF) 
                                                            
Fig. 4-9. Stock and flow structure of the perceived literally homeless families. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑	  𝐿𝐻𝐹 = rsS~v{MvOtv	  rsS
v{MvOtv	  NOyv
𝑑𝑡 + 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑	  𝐿𝐻𝐹 0               (27) 
Perceived LHF accumulates the difference between LHF and the Perceived LHF, with a 
certain perceive time. Initially, Perceived LHF is equal to Perceived LHF (0). 
Stock: TBV-tenants (VT) 
Fig. 4-10. Stock and flow structure of the TBV-tenants. 
𝑉𝑇 = 𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐶𝐵𝐹 + 𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐸𝐹 + 𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐻𝐻𝐹 +
𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝐿𝐻𝐹 − 𝑉𝑇	  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑉𝑇 0 	                             (28) 
accumulates the difference between TBV assisted CBF, TBV assisted EF, TBV assisted 
HHF, TBV assisted LHF and TBV-tenants’ turnover. Initially VT is equal to VT (0).  










































Inflow: TBV assisted EF is given by (12). 
Inflow: TBV assisted HHF is given by (18). 
Inflow: TBV assisted LHF is given by (24). 
Outflow: TBV-tenant turnover 
𝑉𝑇	  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 
Jtu.	  	  KvPuNw	  Lx	  NOyv	  JMMvzz	  R
	                                (29) 
After receiving several years’ assistance, the families that lease up with vouchers have 
opportunities to be independent with renting in the private market without vouchers. 
Stock: Families with other assistance (OAF) 
 Fig. 4-11. Stock and flow structure of the families with other assistance. 
𝑂𝐴𝐹 = 𝐶𝐵𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐸𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
𝐻𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐿𝐻𝐹	  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 −
𝑂𝐴𝐹	  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝐹 0 	                                        (30) 
accumulates the difference between CBF receiving other assistance, EF receiving other 
assistance, HHF receiving other assistance, LHF receiving other assistance and OAF 
turnover. Initially OAF is equal to OAF (0).  
Inflow: CBF receiving other assistance is given by (8). 
Inflow: EF receiving other assistance is given by (14). 
Inflow: HHF receiving other assistance is given by (20). 
Inflow: LHF receiving other assistance is given by (26). 
Outflow: OAF turnover 
𝑂𝐴𝐹	  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 
Jtu.	  	  NOyv	  {vMvOtOPu	  LNwv{	  JzzOzNJPMv








































Similarly, after receiving several years’ assistance, the families have opportunities to be 
independent to rent in the private market without the any assistance. 
Fig. 4-12. Stock and flow structure representing the family homelessness sector. 
Table 2. Parameters and initial values of the homelessness sector.  
No. Parameters and initial stock Value Unit 
1 Initial NCBRF 2240 Family 
2 Initial CBF 3945 Family 
3 Initial EF 135 Family 
4 Initial HHF 342 Family 
5 Initial perceived HHF 342 Family 
6 Initial LHF 50 Family 
7 Initial perceived LHF 50 Family 
8 Initial VT 300 Family 
9 Initial OAF 200 Family 
10 Annual no. of new renter families with children 180 Family 
11 Yearly eviction rate 4.5% 1/year 
12 Yearly propt. of CBF receiving other assistances 4% 1/year 
15 Yearly propt. of EF/HHF receiving other assistances 8% 1/year 
13 Yearly frac. of EF doubling up 40% 1/year 
14 Yearly frac. of EF entering shelters 10% 1/year 
16 Yearly frac. of HHF entering shelters 8% 1/year 
17 Avg. length-of-time shelters 1.5 Years 
18 Perceive time 1 Years 
19 Yearly proportion of LHF with other assistance 0.5 1/year 
20 Avg. time receiving other assistance 7 Years 
21 Avg. length-of-time access TBV 7 Years 
Data Source: 
1. Initial NCBRF: According the US Census Bureau, there were about 36.2% of the total households 
living in renter-occupied housing units pay less than 30% of their income in 2009. Based on the data, 
there were 6185 families with children living in renter-occupied housing units. Based on these 
information, the initial NCBRF was set as 2240 families. 
2. Initial CBF: since there were 2240 families of the total renter families without cost-burden, the 
number with cost-burden was 3945 families in 2009. 






























































































































housing units in Fort Collins is 60% to that in the Larimer County, and the proportion of families with 
children to the total households living in renter-occupied housing units is about 23%. Based on this 
information, I estimated that there were 135 evicted families in Fort Collins.  
4. Initial HHF: As mentioned in the Introduction, by calculating the data provided by the Poudre School 
District, I estimated that there were 342 families that are living in hidden homeless families.  
5. Initial Perceived HHF: the initial value of the perceived HHF equals the initial HHF in the model. 
6. Initial LHF: based on the PiT count, there were 37 families with children be considered as literally 
homelessness in 2013, and the data decreased a little after that. Therefore, the number of LHF in 2009 
was estimated to be 50 families. 
7. Initial Perceived LHF: the initial value of the perceived LHF equals the initial LHF in the model. 
8. Initial VT: according to the HUD’s housing voucher data, there were 743 vouchers in use, considering 
there were 40% of families with children, I estimated that the initial TBV tenants is 300 families. 
9. Initial OAF: Based on the Colorado Housing Fact Sheet, about 40% of the low-income households 
receive rental assistance other than housing choice vouchers. Based on the estimation that 300 families 
receiving housing vouchers, I estimated that 200 families with children receiving assistance other than 
housing choice vouchers.  
10. Annual no. of new renter families with children: The number is set an average number of 180 
families per year calculated by data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 American Community 
Survey 5-Year Estimates.  
11. Yearly eviction rate: as mentioned in the Introduction section, there were about 1000 evictions in 
Larimer County in 2009. Adjusted for a 60% of the population in Fort Collins, and estimate about 22.5% 
of them are families with children, and considering the 3945 families with cost-burden, the yearly 
eviction rate for cost-burdened families with children was estimated to be 3.5% per year.  
12. Yearly proportion of CBF receiving other assistances: Based on the Colorado Housing Fact Sheet, 
about 20% of low-income households receiving rental assistance in Colorado in 2016, and about 40% of 
them receive rental assistance other than housing choice vouchers. Based on this information, I estimated 
that there were about 4% of CBF per year receiving other assistances. 
13. Yearly proportion of EF/HHF receiving other assistances: Based on the above information, I 
estimated that about 8% of EF/HHF receiving other assistances. 
14. Yearly frac. of EF doubling up: no specific data was reported regarding the yearly proportion of 
evicted families doubling up. Based on my calculation, there are 56 new families becoming hidden 
homeless from 2009 to 2010. And there were about 135 evicted families in 2009. Based on this 
information, the “yearly frac. of EF doubling up” was estimated to be 40% per year.  
15. Yearly fraction of EF entering shelters: data showed that there were about 2.7 million Americans 
facing eviction in 2015 (McMullen, 2016), and there were about 0.4 million homelessness staying in 
emergency shelters that year. Based on this information, and considering the families’ preference for 
doubling-up than entering shelters, the “yearly fraction of EF entering shelters” was estimated to be 10% 
per year.  
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16. Yearly frac. of HHF entering shelters: according to the 2010 Annual Homeless Assessment Report 
to Congress, the yearly fraction of hidden homeless families becoming literally homelessness is about 8% 
per year. 
17. Avg. length-of-time shelters: according to Homeward 2020, the average length-of-time a family 
stays in shelters is about 1.5 years. 
18. Perceive time: the time need to conducting survey, collecting data and reporting was estimated to be 
1 year.  
19. Yearly proportion of LHF with other assistance: because of the vulnerability of the LHF, more 
programs are aimed to help them. Therefore, “proportion of LHF with other assistance” was estimated to 
be a larger value of 50% per year. 
20. Avg. length-of-time access TBV: it has been demonstrated that families that lease up with the 
vouchers, after receiving about seven years’ assistance, have opportunities to be independent to rent in 
the private market without the vouchers (Wood et al., 2008).  
21. Avg. time receiving other assistance: no data was found regarding this parameter, the time was set 
as the same as the “avg. length-of-time access TBV”. 
 
4.2 The Housing Market Sector 
Fig. 4-13. Stock and flow structure representing the housing market sector. 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑙𝑜𝑤	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑜𝑛	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
SJyOKOvz	  OP	  Pvv
OPONOJK	  xJyOKOvz	  OP	  Pvv
vyJP	  vKJzNOMON
                                   (32) 
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝐶𝐵𝐹 + 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝐸𝐹 + 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝐻𝐻𝐹 + 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝐿𝐻𝐹         (33) 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑙𝑜𝑤	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝑜𝑛	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠	  𝑜𝑛	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡                              (34) 
It is argued that the increase of low-income housing demand will increase the housing 




























































“monthly median rental housing cost” is modeled endogenously and could be affected 
by the number of families in need. Although the housing cost could also be influenced 
by many other factors in the real world, those effects was set as an exogenous value 
because of the scope of this study. 
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = yLPNwK	  yvOJP	  {vPNJK	  wLzOPu	  MLzN
	  yLPNwK	  yvOJP	  {vPNv{z	  OPMLyv
                    (35) 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜	  𝑜𝑛	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
{vPN	  NL	  OPMLyv	  {JNOL
PL{yJK	  {vPN	  NL	  OPMLyv	  {JNOL
{vPN	  NL	  OPMLyv	  {JNOL	  vKJzNOMON
                       (36) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑁𝐶𝐵𝑅𝐹	  𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 ∗
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜	  𝑜𝑛	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒                     (37) 
Table 3. Parameters and initial values of the housing market sector. 
No. Parameters and initial stock Value Unit 
22 Demand elasticity 0.6 unitless  
23 Initial monthly housing cost 826 USD/family/month 
24 Effect of other factors on FMR   unitless 
25 monthly median renters’ income data USD/family/month 
26 Normal rent-to-income ratio 0.3 unitless 
27 Rent-to-income ratio elasticity 0.6 unitless 
28 Normal yrly. propt. of NCBRF being cost-burdened 0.1 1/year 
 
Data Source: 
22. Demand elasticity: based on the historical data provided by US Census Bureau, the FMR was 832 
USD/family/month in 2010, and the number was 893 in 2015. The initial families in demand was about 
4450 families, and the incremental was about 300 families from 2009 to 2015. Based on this information, 
the demand elasticity was calculated to be 0.6. 
23. Initial monthly housing cost: data retrieved from the US Census Bureau.  
24. Effect of other factors on FMR: the effect of other factors was set as an exogenous value varied 
year by year between 1 and 1.5. 
25. Monthly median renters’ income: the number was based on the historical data and varied year by 
year. 
26. Normal rent-to-income ratio: based on the HUD’s definition, families paying more than 30% of 
their monthly income is considered as cost-burdened. Therefore, the normal rent-to-income ratio was set 
as 0.3. 
27. Rent-to-income ratio elasticity: no data were reported regarding the rent-to-income ratio elasticity, 
the number was set as the same as the demand elasticity. 
28. Normal yearly proportion of NCBRF being cost-burdened: based on the US Census Bureau, 
about 75 families added to the stock of CBF in 2010. Considering that some of the CBF being evicted or 
receiving assistance, it was estimated that about 235 families becoming cost-burdened that year. Since 
there were about 2400 non-cost-burdened families in 2010, the yearly proportion of NCBRF being cost-
burdened was set as 10% per year. 
 
From the above structural analysis, it is known that the family homelessness is a 
dynamic process. The stock of at-risk or homeless families is influenced by both the 
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inflows and the outflows of it. If the total inflow is larger than the total outflow, the 
goal of ending homelessness would never be met.  
Although there are various assistance programs can prevent the number of HHF 
becoming so large, considering the scope of this study, I focused on the TBV program 
and explored how the TBV program works by three sectors: the voucher sector, the 
landlord sector and the funding sector, in the following parts.  
4.3 The Voucher Sector 
An aging chain from applying vouchers, screening, issuing to finally moving to market 
house is used to trace the sequence of activities that typically occur in a tenant-based 
Housing Choice Voucher program (Fig. 4.2-1). The following are details regarding each 
step. 
Fig. 4-14. Stock and flow structure representing the TBV administration process. 
Stock: Families on waitlist (WF) 
                                            
Fig. 4-15. Stock and flow structure of the families on waitlist. 
































WF accumulates the difference between TBV applying, screening and WF purging. 
Initially WF is equal to WF (0).  
Inflow: Families applying for TBV 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑 ∗
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑇𝐵𝑉                       (39) 
Where 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 𝐶𝐵𝐹 + 𝐸𝐹 + 𝐻𝐻𝐹 + 𝐿𝐻𝐹                            (40) 
Family in need is defined as the at-risk or homeless family in this study. Its number is 
the sum of the cost-burdened families, evicted families, hidden homeless families and 
the literally homeless families included in the model. These families make application 
to a public housing authority (PHA) and are placed on the PHA's waiting list based on 
the information they provide without verification.  
Outflow: WF go through the screening process 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑊𝐹 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝐴	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑊𝐹	  	  	  	  	                       (41) 
Before issuing a voucher, Housing Catalyst (the Public Housing Authority in the city of 
Fort Collins) must verify all of the information provided by the family in order to 
determine whether the family is eligible to receive voucher assistance. It is called the 
screening process.  
Outflow: WF purged from the waitlist 
𝑊𝐹	  𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑	  𝑊𝐹 ∗𝑊𝐹               (42) 
Those families that are not interested in the vouchers because of any reasons will be 
purged from the waitlist.  
Stock: Eligible Applicants (EA) 
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Fig. 4-16. Stock and flow structure of the eligible applicants. 
𝐸𝐴 = 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐸𝐴	  𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴 0                   (43) 
accumulates the difference between EA screening, issuing and EA purging. Initially EA 
is equal to EA (0).  
Inflow: Screening is given by (37). 
Outflow: EA are purged from the waitlist 
𝑊𝐹	  𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑	  𝑊𝐹 ∗𝑊𝐹               (44) 
Those families that are not interested in the vouchers because of any reasons will be 
purged from the waitlist.  
Outflow: Eligible Applicants are issued vouchers 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 = (Y;yJ.	  	  PL.	  	  Lx	  Y	  v	  Ozzv	  R)
Jtv{Juv	  Ozzv	  NOyv
	                                (45) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝐴	  𝑏𝑒	  𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = max.𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 − 𝑉𝑇                    (46) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥.𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 = JtJOKJKv	  R∗tLMwv{	  NOKOJNOLP	  {JNv
zzv	  R	  v{	  xJyOK	  
                      (47)                          
Eligible families are selected by lottery to receive a voucher if it is available. 
Housing Catalyst’s maximum workload is determined by the number of available TBV 





























Stock: TBV Holders (VH) 
                               
Fig. 4-17. Stock and flow structure of TBV holders. 
𝑉𝐻 = 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 −𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑉𝐻 0     (48) 
accumulates the difference between issuing, TBV holders, leasing and TBV expiring. 
Initially VH is equal to VH (0).  
Inflow: Issuing is given by (41). 
Part of the families with issued vouchers have opportunities to find a landlord accepting 
the voucher. The number is not only determined by the number of issuing, but also by 
the voucher unit vacancy. 
𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑢𝑝	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌(𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑚𝑎𝑥.	  	  𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔; 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 ; 𝑎𝑣𝑔	  𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)                (49) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑	  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒          (50) 
Outflow: Expiring 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌(𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔; 0 ; 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑦	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)       (51) 
Usually, 60 days' searching time is given to voucher receivers, and they must lease up 
with the voucher before the searching period ends. If they cannot find an apartment 
within the given time, their vouchers will be expired. 
Outflow: TBV holders moving to market housing 

























After receiving several years’ assistance, most of the families are able to be independent. 
Stock: Available Tenant-based Vouchers (TBV) 
Fig. 4-18. Stock and flow structure of the available tenant-based vouchers. 
Available 𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 +
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑	  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 − 𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	   0             (53) 
This stock accumulates the difference between new TBV, TBV in use and perceived 
replaced TBV. Initially TBV is equal to Available TBV (0).  
Flow: Annual adjustment of available TBV 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = vzO{v	  JtJOKJKv	  R~JtJOKJKv	  R
JtJOKJKv	  R	  JzNyvPN	  NOyv
+
𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑢𝑠𝑒 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑	  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑	  𝑇𝐵𝑉                                 (54) 
Inflow: Expired vouchers 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑	  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌1(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑝𝑒𝑟	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦; 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑦	  𝑇𝐵𝑉                (55)  
































































𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑖n	  use = 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑝𝑒𝑟	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦                          (56) 
Fig. 4-19. Stock and flow structure representing the at-risk or homeless families receiving TBV. 
𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝐶𝐵𝐹 = 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝐶𝐵𝐹 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔                         (57) 
𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝐶𝐵𝐹 = QRS
xJyOKOvz	  OP	  Pvv
                                   (58) 
The equation of allocation EF/HHF/LHF is same to the equation of allocation CBF. 
Table 4. Parameters and initial values of the voucher sector. 
No. Parameters and initial stock Value Unit 
29 Initial WF 100 Family 
30 Initial EA 100 Family 
31 Initial VH 300 Family 
32 Initial TBV 300 Family 
33 Yearly proportion of families applying for TBV 20% 1/year 
34 Yearly proportion of purged WF/EA 40% 1/year 
35 Yearly proportion of EA to WF 50% 1/year 
36 Issued TBV per family 1 Voucher/family 
37 Average issue time 1 Year 
38 Average expiry time 1 Year 
39 Average leasing time 3/12 Year 
40 Available TBV adjustment time 1 Year 
41 Average time to perceive expiry TBV 2 Years 












































29. Initial WF: according to PHA Census survey in 2014, there were 90 families on the Housing 
Catalyst’s waitlist for housing choice vouchers, therefore, the number of eligible applicants was set as 
100 families in 2009. 
30. Initial EA: no data were found regarding this parameter, the number was set as the same as initial 
WF. 
31. Initial VH: according to HUD’s housing voucher data, there were 743 housing vouchers distributed 
in 2009 in Fort Collins, approximately 40% of them were distributed to families with children. Based on 
this information, the number of voucher holders was estimated to be 300 families in 2009. 
32. Initial TBV: Considering there were about 300 families receiving housing vouchers in 2009, and the 
door for housing vouchers has been closed, the number of initial TBV was also set as 300 families, which 
is the same as the initial TBV tenants. 
33. Yearly proportion of families applying for TBV：data about the proportion of at-risk or homeless 
families applying for TBV was not available. The number was estimated to be 10% per year. 
34. Yearly proportion of purged WF/EA: no data were found regarding the purged fraction, according 
to the Housing Catalyst in Fort Collins, the response rate for families who come to the top of the list and 
turn in their eligibility packet is about 30%. Therefore, the number was estimated as 40% per year. 
the number was estimated to be 40% per year. 
35. Yearly proportion of EA to WF：According to housing catalyst, the maximum income level for a 
3-people household is $34,600, and applicants that meet the income requirement will be considered as 
eligible. Based on the US Census Bureau data, there are about 50% of the households living in renter-
occupied housing units earn less than that level. Therefore, the number was estimated to be 50% a year. 
37. Average issue time: the voucher funds were renewed year by year, therefore, I estimated the 
vouchers are also issued year by year. 
38. Average expiry time: according to HUD, usually, 60 days' searching time is given to voucher 
receivers, and they must lease up with the voucher before the searching period ends. 
39. Average leasing time: according to the Housing Catalyst, the success rate for the families leasing up 
with a voucher is about 70%. Based on this information, I estimate it takes 3months for the families to 
lease up with their vouchers, therefore, about 70% could lease up within the expiry time. 
40. Available TBV adjustment time: Given that HUD allocates its funding year by year, the time need 
to update the stock of TBV was estimated to be 1 year.  
41. Average time to perceive expiry TBV: Given that the Housing Catalyst adjust its TBV year by year, 
I estimated it takes one year for the Housing Catalyst to perceive all the expired vouchers.  
42. Voucher utilization rate: based on HUD’s data, the voucher utilization rate of the Housing Catalyst 
changed every year. An average number of 1.05 was used in the model. 
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Fig. 4-20. Stock and flow structure representing the homelessness sector, the housing market sector 
and the voucher sector. 
4.4 The Landlord Sector 
This structure represents the process of landlord participating the TBV program, those 
landlords need be briefed first. 
Fig. 4-21. Stock and flow structure representing the landlord participation process. 
Stock: Potential Landlord (PL) 
𝑃𝐿 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤	  𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑑 − 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑃𝐿	  (0)                           (59) 
accumulates the difference between new landlord and landlord briefing. Initially PL is 








































































































































































































































                
Fig. 4-22. Stock and flow structure of the landlord sector. 
Inflow: New landlord 
𝑁𝑒𝑤	  𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑑 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝐿                   (60) 
Outflow: Landlord briefing 
𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ	  	    (61) 
𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 	   	  ¡¢£	  ¤¥
£¦	  §¢	  ¨£©¨ ¢©	  ª¢«¦	  ¡ 
	  	  	  	  	                     (62) 
𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ = 	  	   	  Rr¬r
NLNJK	  KJPKL{z
∗
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ	  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝐿	                                     (63) 
Stock: Briefed Landlord (BL) 
𝐵𝐿 = 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐵𝐿	  (0)                          (64) 
accumulates the difference between landlord briefing and landlord participating. 
Initially BL is equal to BL (0).  
Inflow: Landlord briefing is given by (60). 
Outflow: Landlord participating 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ	  	                                    (65) 

















































𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ = 	  	   	  r
NLNJK	  KJPKL{z
∗
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ	  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝐿                                    (67) 
Stock: Landlord Pool (LP) 
𝐿𝑃 = 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 −𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑃	  (0)                      (68) 
accumulates the difference between landlord participating and landlord withdrawing. 
Initially LP is equal to LP (0).  
Inflow: Landlord participating is given by (64). 
Outflow: Landlord withdrawing 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑑	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐿𝑃	  𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠	  𝑜𝑛	  𝐿𝑃	  𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐿𝑃                           (69) 
In my model, there is initially not enough voucher units to rent to every TBV holder, as 
illustrated by Ferrier (2015). Then the stock of landlord pool is increased as a result of 
more and more landlords being briefed and becoming interested in participating the 




   Fig. 4-23. Stock and flow structure representing how voucher units affect voucher leasing. 
𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐿𝑃 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑔	  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝑝𝑒𝑟	  𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑑 ∗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡	  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑	  𝑏𝑒	  𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛  (70) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟	  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 −











































































Table 5. Parameters and initial values of the landlord sector. 
No. Parameters and initial stock Value Unit 
43 Avg. unit per landlord 2.2 Unit/landlord 
44 Initial potential landlords 11,000 Landlords  
45 Initial briefed landlords 150 Landlords 
46 Initial landlord pool 273 Landlords 
47 Yearly landlord increasing rate 0.9% 1/year 
48 Word of mouth effectiveness 0.2 unitless 
49 Avg. per landlord briefing cost 1000 USD/landlord 
50 Yearly proportion of participation from briefing 0.3 1/year 
51 Normal yearly proportion of LP withdrawing 5% 1/year 
52 Proportion of vacant housing could be leased to families with children 0.5 unitless 
Data Source:  
43. Avg. unit per landlord: according to the US Census Bureau, there were about 48 million rental units 
in the US in 2017. According to the Rental Protection Agency, there were about 22 million landlords in 
the US that year. Based on this information, I calculated that a landlord has approximately 2.2 housing 
unit on average. 
44. Initial potential landlords: according to the US Census Bureau, there were about 25 thousand rental 
units in the City of Fort Collins in 2010, I assume that the number did not change a lot compared to the 
year of 2009. Divided by an average of 2.2 housing unit per landlord, it was estimated that there were 
11,000 potential landlords in 2009. 
45. Initial briefed landlords: no data were found regarding this parameter, the number was estimated to 
be 150 landlords. 
46. Initial landlord pool: the number was set as 273 landlords to be the same as the number of the TBV 
tenants. 
47. Yearly landlord increasing rate: calculated by data provided by Rental Protection Agency. 
48. Word of mouth effectiveness: it is estimated that 1 in 5 landlords could be influenced by those 
landlords who were willing to participate in the TBV program. 
49. Avg. per landlord briefing cost: no data were found regarding this parameter, the number was 
estimated to be 1000 USD/landlord. 
50. Yearly proportion of participation from briefing: I estimated that 3 in 10 landlords that are briefed 
is willing to participate. 
51. Normal yearly proportion of LP withdrawing: I estimate 1 in 20 landlords will withdraw from the 
landlord list. 
52. Proportion of vacant housing could be leased to families with children: I estimated that half of the 
rental units could be leased to families with children. 
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Fig. 4-24. Stock and flow structure representing the homelessness sector, the housing market sector, 
the voucher sector and the landlord sector. 
4.5 The Funding Sector 























































































































































































































































































                          
Fig. 4-25. Stock and flow structure of the subsidy funds. 
𝑆𝐹 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑡 +
𝑆𝐹	   0                                                              (72) 
accumulates the difference between funding incrementing and funding spending. 
Initially SF is equal to SF (0).  
When funding is available to support new tenant-based vouchers, HUD publishes a 
Notice of Funds Available (NOFA) in the Federal Register telling PHAs how and when 
to apply and what criteria will be used to select PHAs to receive funding. The funds 
received through this process at any one time are referred to as funding incrementing. 
These funds are spent to give rent assistance directly to the landlords.  
Outflow: Funding spending 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑎𝑐tual	  yearly	  per	  TBV	  subsidy ∗ 𝑉𝑇           (73) 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑒𝑟	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 =
𝑀𝐴𝑋	  (𝑀𝐼𝑁 yLPNwK	  zzO	  xPz

; 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 ; 0)            (74) 
Subsidy are paid to those eligible families based on the desired monthly subsidy 
































                              
Fig. 4-26. Factors influence the desired monthly subsidy. 
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 = 𝑀𝐴𝑋	   𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝐹𝑀𝑅 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗
𝑎𝑣𝑔.𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠; 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 ;min 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑     
(75) 
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟	  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑	  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙        (76) 
The payment standard is the maximum subsidy that a PHA can pay for a family, based 
on the size of the unit the family will occupy. When a participating family leases a unit, 
the amount of the subsidy is reduced by amounts paid by the family.  
 Fig. 4-27. Effect of monthly subsidy on average length-of-time access TBV. 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦	  𝑜𝑛	  𝑎𝑣𝑔	  𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 =
JMNJK	  yLPNwK	  v{	  R	  zzO
vzO{v	  yLPNwK	  zzO
zzO	  vKJzNOMON
                              (77) 
𝑎𝑣𝑔	  𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 ∗
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦	  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦	  𝑜𝑛	  𝑎𝑣𝑔	  𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠	  𝑇𝐵𝑉            (78)    
The bigger the difference between the actual subsidy and the desired subsidy, the longer 
time for the TBV tenants need to become independent.                    









































𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔; 𝑎𝑣𝑔	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒                   (79) 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙	   𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔; 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 1 ∗ (1 +
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                                           (80) 
HUD calculates a PHA’s current-year funding by looking at the amounts used by the 
PHA in the previous year, with an adjustment.  
Stock: Administrative Fee Reserves (ARF) 
                              
Fig. 4-28. Stock and flow structure of the administrative fee reserves. 
𝐴𝐹𝑅 = 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐴𝐹𝑅	   0    (81)                                                    
Similar to the subsidy funds, the admin fee reserve accumulates the difference between 
admin fee incrementing and spending. Initially AFR is equal to AFR (0).  
Outflow: Admin fee spending 
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝑝𝑒𝑟	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡	  𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑉𝑇         (82) 
Inflow: Admin fee incrementing 
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙	  𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒; 𝑎𝑣𝑔	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒                (83) 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙	  𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒 = 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙	   𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔; 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 1 ∗ (1 +
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                                          (84) 






















Table 6. Parameters and initial value of the funding sector. 
No. Parameters and initial stock Value Unit 
53 Initial subsidy funds 3,000,000 USD  
54 Initial administrative fee reserves 175,000 USD 
55 Renewal funding inflation 2% unitless 
56 Avg. funding allocation time 1 Year 
57 Yearly proportion of TBV reserves to subsidy 1 1/year 
58 Cost-burden ratio 0.3 unitless 
59 Payment standard level 1.1 unitless 
60 Subsidy elasticity -0.8 unitless 
61 Adjusted per TBV tenant admin fee 400 USD/family/year 
62 Yearly proportion of admin fee to increase LP 0.1 1/year 
Data Source: 
53/54. Initial subsidy funds/ administrative fee reserves: no data were found regarding the number. 
Since initially there are 300 families receiving vouchers. It was assumed that the funds was slightly larger 
than the amount needed to cover the existing TBV tenants. 
55. Renewal funding inflation: Based on the data provided by HUD, the “renewal funding inflation” 
changed every year. The number was set as an average of 2% in the model. 
56. Avg. funding allocation time: HUD allocate its funding year by year. 
57. Yearly proportion of TBV reserves to subsidy: it is assumed that all of the subsidy reserves could 
be used to help those families. 
58. Cost-burden ratio: Based on HUD’s definition, the subsidy is aimed to help the renters not spending 
more than 30% of their income. 
59. Payment standard level: Payment standards are set by the PHA at levels between 90 percent and 
110 percent of the HUD-published Fair Market Rent (FMR) for the metropolitan or other area, based on 
the PHA’s knowledge of the local rental market. The number was set as 110 percent of the FMR for 
Housing Catalyst. 
60. Subsidy elasticity: the number was estimated to be -0.8.  
61. Adjusted per TBV tenant admin fee: the number was estimated to be 400 USD family-1 year-1. 
62. Yearly proportion of admin fee to increase LP: the number was estimated to be 10% per year. 
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Fig. 4-29. Stock and flow structure representing the homelessness sector, the housing market sector, 
the voucher sector, the landlord sector and the funding sector. 
 
5. MODEL VALIDATION 
By referring the model structure, parameter values and equations to the literature and 
real data in the previous section, we have partially done structure confirmation and 
parameter confirmation tests which were mentioned in (Barlas, 1996). The model also 
has passed the dimensional consistency test checked within the Stella Architect 
software. In this part, we will conduct more validation tests. 
5.1 Initialize the family homeless system in equilibrium 
Before conducting the validation tests, we need to firstly adjust the presented model in 
equilibrium. As shown in Fig. 5-1, in this equilibrium state, inflows and outflows equal 






































































































































































































































































































































































            
Fig. 5-1. The number of hidden homeless families when the model is in equilibrium. Under this state, 
the number of hidden homeless families was set to 400 over the entire simulation period. 
What to mention is that, in equilibrium,  
𝐸𝑄	  𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 = 𝐸𝐴 + 𝑉𝑇 ∗ 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑝𝑒𝑟	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑦                (85)                                    
which means that the “max. no of EA be issued TBV” equals the number of EA in 
equilibrium. 
And 
𝐸𝑄	  𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙	  𝑇𝐵𝑉	  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑	  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦	  𝑝𝑒𝑟	  𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟    (86) 
𝐸𝑄	  𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙	  𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛	  𝑓𝑒𝑒	  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 ∗ JyOP	  xvv	  v{	  tLMwv{
{LL{NOLP	  Lx	  JyOP	  xvv	  NL	  	  R
 (87) 
Which means that the desired available TBV is equal to available TBV in equilibrium. 
Some parameters and their values necessary to keep the model in the equilibrium state 
were listed in the appendix.  
5.2 Shock Tests 
5.2.1 Yearly eviction rate shock tests 
As shown in Fig. 5-2, if the yearly eviction rate increased by 50% since 2010, 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘	  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃(50% ∗
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒; 2010)                                           (88) 
the inflow, “EF doubling up”, of the HHF jump to a higher level, and the amount of 












































Fig. 5-2. Yearly eviction rate shock test. 
5.2.2 Eligible applicants and renewal funding shock tests 
In equilibrium, the number of available TBV equals the total TBV tenants and the 
eligible applicants. As shown in Fig. 5-3, if both the eligible applicants and the renewal 
funding inflation (RFI) increased since 2010, the number of HHF decreased after a 
delay.  
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠	  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘	  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 = 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑇𝐵𝑉 +
𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃(50% ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦	  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑓𝑜𝑟	  𝑇𝐵𝑉; 2010)     (89) 
𝑅𝐹𝐼	  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘	  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 = 𝐸𝑄	  𝑅𝐹𝐼 + 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃(20%; 2010)                       (90) 
 
Fig. 5-3. Eligible applicants and renewal funding shock test. 
 
5.3 Extreme-condition test  
The extreme-condition test involves assigning extreme values to selected parameters 
and comparing the model-generated behavior to the anticipated behavior of the real 
system under the same extreme condition (Barlas, 1996).  
As shown in Fig. 5-4, if there were no families being cost-burdened, 
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟	  𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠	  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	  𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 = 0                (91) 
























































































































                              
Fig. 5-4. Sketch of possible response if there were no families becoming cost-burdened. 
5.4 Reference behavior pattern test 
Generally, as shown in Fig. 5-5, the simulated behavior successfully replicates the 
general increasing trend shown in the reference mode, probably due to the most critical 
factors that influence the inflows or the outflows of the stock of HHF are successfully 
illustrated in the model. 
                               
Fig. 5-5. The simulated results and the historical data of the HHF number. 
Only compared the simulated results with the reference mode is insufficient to make 
sure the model truly represents the process of families receiving tenant-based vouchers, 
since the number of HHFs being assisted by TBV is only about 15% of the total 
families receiving TBV. Therefore, the simulation results of the “available TBV” and 
the “TBV tenants” were compared with their historical data to check if the model 
represents the reality.  
As shown in Fig. 5-6, the simulated results of the number of “available TBV” fits well 
with the historical data from 2009 to 2014, after that the simulated number decreased a 
little while the historical number kept increasing. The simulated behavior of the “TBV 






























































































since the specific data of the authorized vouchers for families with children and their 
vouchers in use are unavailable and was calculated.  
Fig. 5-6. The simulated results and the historical data of the “available TBV” and “TBV tenants”. 
Note: The Housing Voucher data provided by the CBPP only showed the total amount of the authorized 
vouchers and vouchers in use, no data about families with children are specified. Based on the 2016 
annual report of the Housing Catalyst, about 40% of the vouchers were used by families with children. 
The percent was used when calculating the number of available vouchers for families with children and 
their vouchers in use. 
5.5 Sensitivity tests 
As we mentioned in the Quantitative Model section, the data of some parameters, 
including the “fraction of EF doubling up”, the “yearly proportion of LHF with other 
assistance” and the “avg. time receiving other assistance” in the homelessness sector, 
the “yearly proportion of families in need apply for TBV” in the voucher sector, the 
“initial briefed landlords” and the “word of mouth effectiveness” in the landlord sector, 
and the “initial subsidy funds” in the funding sector, were unavailable and their 
numbers were just estimation. In this part, sensitivity analyses were conducted to check 
if the uncertainly of these parameters could influence the number of HHF, the number 
of available TBV or the number of TBV tenants. 
As shown in Fig. 5-7, the exact number of HHF differed a little but the increasing trend 
still holds true when the “fraction of EF doubling up” changes. The changes of “yearly 
proportion of LHF with other assistance” and “avg. time receiving other assistance” 
parameters do not have significant effects on the number of HHF. 
                                      
Fig. 5-7. Sensitivity analysis of the HHF number as a function of “yearly frac. of EF doubling up”, 
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As shown in Fig. 5-8, if the “initial subsidy funds” is too little to cover the initial TBV 
tenants, the available TBV will show a big difference, otherwise the change of the 
“initial subsidy funds” does not have significant effect on the number of available TBV.  
                          
Fig. 5-8. Sensitivity analysis of the available TBV as a function of “initial subsidy funds”. 
As shown in Fig. 5-9, the number of TBV tenants shows a similar trend when the 
“yearly proportion of families apply for TBV”, the “initial briefed landlord”, or the 
“word of mouth effectiveness” changes, except the case when the “word of mouth 
effectiveness” is very low.  
                                               
Fig. 5-9. Sensitivity analysis of the number of TBV tenants as a function of the “yearly proportion 
of families apply for TBV”, the “initial briefed landlord”, and the “word of mouth effectiveness”. 
The above sensitivity tests reveal that the model is insensitive to those estimated 
parameters. 
Based on the results of the above shock tests, the extreme-condition tests, reference 
behavior pattern testing and sensitivity tests, we can conclude that the simulation results 
are consistent with the expected behavior of the real system. 
 
6. BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
From the simulated behavior, we can see that the number of HHF increased from 2009 
to 2016. In this part, I will try to answer why the number of HHF increased and how the 
number will change in the future. To this end, results were obtained by simulations 







































































































































specifications: Integration Method: Runge-Kutta (4th order); Time Unit: Years; Time 
Step: 1/16; Time Horizon:17 years from 2009 to 2025.  
6.1 Why did the number of HHF increase? 
As shown in Fig. 6-1, the number of HHF increased because the total inflow adding to 
the stock was larger than the total outflow subtracted from the stock.  
                         
Fig. 6-1. Total inflow and total outflow of the HHF stock in base run.  
Specifically, the total inflow is the summary of “EF doubling up” and “HHF repeating”, 
the total outflow is the summary of “HHF entering shelters”, “TBV assisted HHF” and 
“HHF with other assistance”. I will explore each flow in the following parts. 
6.1.1 The increased inflow of “EF doubling up” leading to an increased number of 
HHF.  
After checking the inflows and outflows of the HHF stock, I found that the increased 
number of HHF is mainly caused by the inflow, “EF doubling-up”, among the five 
flows (Fig. 6-2), meaning that the number of HHF increased when a large number of 
evicted families doubled-up due to some reasons.   
                            






























































Further, I found that the number of “EF doubling-up” increased as a result of the 
increasing number of EF. Specifically, with the faster increase of the housing rent than 
the income, many renter families were cost-burdened and at imminent risk of 
homelessness. When experiencing an adverse event, some of these cost-burdened 
families were fortunate to receive a rent assistance to overcome the crisis, while the rest 
ones were most likely to be evicted by their landlords due to the limited capacity of rent 
assistance in the city of FC. As a result, more evicted families doubled-up with their 
friends/relatives (Fig.6-3).  
 
Fig. 6-3. Annual number of renter families being cost-burdened and the being evicted. 
6.1.2 The increased but limited outflow of “TBV assisted HHF” and “HHF with 
other assistance” keep the number of HHF at its historical level. 
As shown in Fig. 6-4, if there were no assistance9 to help the at-risk or homeless 
families, which means they have no chance to get rid of the vulnerable situation, the 
number of the HHF is expected to increase to an extremely high level.  
                              
Fig. 6-4. The number of HHF if there were no assistance to help the HHF. 
It is the assistance programs that keep the number of HHF from increasing very fast. 
The effect of the TBV and other assistance programs on reducing the HHF was shown 
                                                
9 If there were no assistance, the “yearly proportion of families receiving other assistance” is 0/year, and 

























































































in the following loop (Fig. 6-5), with a closer attention paid to the TBV program. After 
an administration process from submitting application to finally be issued a voucher, 
some of the HHF were fortunate to lease an apartment and got rid of the risk situation.  
                                                  
Fig. 6-5. The feedback loop illustrating the effect of TBV and other assistances on ending HHF. 
We can imagine that if there were no limit on the assistance, all of the at-risk or 
homeless families will be assisted, and the HHF population will eventually decrease to 
0. 
However, in reality, both the TBV capacity and the capacity of other assistances are 
limited. The lack of TBV and the short of other assistances made the total outflow of 
the stock of HHF less than its inflow, and were responsible for the increased HHF 
population.  
As shown in Fig. 6-6, there was a large number of eligible applicants every year 
(represented as “screening”), but the annual number of families be issued vouchers 
(represented as “issuing”, constrained by the available TBV) and the “annual number of 
families leasing up vouchers” (constrained by the “voucher units vacancy”) were much 
less than the number of eligible applicants. 
                                              







































































The effect of the lack of the TBV program, in the form of either available TBV or 
voucher units, on the HHF population could be represented in Fig. 6-7.  
                                    
Fig. 6-7. The limit of TBV on HHF. 
Further, I found that the main factor that affected the number of HHF shifted from the 
restriction of “yearly voucher unit vacancy” to the limit of available vouchers during 
the past years. As shown in Fig. 6-8, before the year of 2013, the voucher issuing was 
larger than the number of yearly voucher unit vacancy. The increased number of HHF 
was mainly resulted from the restriction of voucher units during this period. However, 
with the expansion of the landlord pool, either as a result of marketing or because of the 
word of mouth, the annual number of voucher unit vacancy exceeded the available 
vouchers. The increased trend of the HHF population was mainly resulted from the 
restriction of available vouchers after the year of 2013. 
                              
Fig. 6-8. Shift between the limit of voucher units and the limit of available TBV. 
The reason why the number of “issuing” decreased significantly after 2014 is that the 




























































could cover after the year of 2014 (Fig. 6-9). Therefore, not so many vouchers could be 
issued unless some TBV tenants quit.  
                             
Fig. 6-9. TBV tenants and the desired available TBV the subsidy could cover. 
6.2 How will the number of HHF change?  
This part mainly shows the simulation results under two scenarios: the “business-as-
usual” scenario and the “budget-reduction” scenario.  
6.2.1 The “Business-as-usual” scenario 
The “business-as-usual” scenario was run focusing on the question: how will the 
number of HHF change, if they are not given enough attention as currently? 
As shown in Fig. 6-10, if there are no new policies to help the hidden homeless families, 
their amount will keep increasing in the future. 
                          
Fig. 6-10. Number of hidden homeless families in the “Business-as-usual” scenario. 
The increasing trend is mainly because the high number of “EF doubling up” far 
outweighs the number of HHF receiving assistance, especially the number of “TBV 












































                                             
Fig. 6-11. Flows of the number of HHF in the “business-as-usual” scenario. 
What to mention specifically is the unexpected cycles of the “TBV assisted HHF”. As 
shown in Fig. 6-12, the number of “TBV tenants” increased after 2010, followed by an 
increase of the “annual funding spending”. However, because of the delay of the 
funding allocation process, the “annual funding incrementing” lagged behind, and the 
subsidy funds decreased. As a result, the desired number of vouchers that the subsidy 
funds could cover was lower than the number of “TBV tenants”. In order to assist all 
the families, the “actual monthly per TBV subsidy” had to be shrunk. When the “annual 
funding incrementing” caught up with the “annual funding spending”, and the number 
of “TBV tenants” decreased to fit the subsidy funds, both the subsidy reserve and the 
actual monthly subsidy increased. Therefore, the number of “TBV tenants” increases 
again after a delay. This process repeats about every 6 years, and this is the reason why 
the number of “TBV assisted HHF” cycles over time. 
 
                                         




































































































The effect of the funding incrementing delay on the number of HHFs could be 
illustrated by the following loops. 
                              
Fig. 6-13. The effect of the funding incrementing delay on the number of HHFs. 
The above mentioned simulation results were based on the assumption that the housing 
cost will increase faster than the monthly median income in the future, while how the 
rent-to-income ratio will change is uncertain. In this sensitivity test, the rent-to-income 
ratio was set either as a moderate value of 0.3 or a lower value of 0.2 from 2018 on, to 
compare with the “business-as-usual” scenario. As shown in Fig. 6-14, the change of 
the rent-to-income ratio does not significantly influence the number of HHF. 
 
Fig. 6-14. Sensitivity analysis of the HHF number as a function of rent-to-income ratio. 
6.2.2 The “Budget-reduction” scenario 
This scenario is aimed to understand the question, how will the amount of HHF change 
if the federal budget is reduced since 2018?  
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙	  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
= 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦	   𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔; 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 1 ∗ 1 + 𝑅𝐹𝐼 ∗ (1
− 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝	   𝐵𝑅; 𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇 + 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝	   𝐵𝑅; 𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇 + 1 	  


































































































𝐵𝑅 = 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦	   𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔; 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 1 ∗ 𝐵𝑅𝑅 
Budget reduction rate (BRR) is 13.2%10. 
Budget reduction implementation time (BRIT) is the year in 2018. 
As shown in Fig. 6-15, if there is a reduction of HUD funding from 2018, the number 
of hidden homeless families will not show any difference. 
                           
Fig. 6-15. Number of hidden homeless families if the federal budget cuts are implemented in 2018. 
However, this does not mean the budget reduction does not have any influence on the 
family homelessness system. According to the simulation results, the federal budget 
cuts mainly have three effects.  
Firstly, the budget cuts will decrease the desired available TBV and thus reduce the 
issuable vouchers (Fig. 6-16).  
                                            
Fig. 6-16. Changes in the available TBV and issuing if the budget cuts are implemented in 2018. 
Secondly, as we mentioned before, in order to cover all the TBV tenants, the Housing 
Catalyst have to decrease the “actual monthly per TBV subsidy”. As a result, the 
families who are receiving vouchers have to depend on the assistance for a longer time 
(Fig. 6-17). 
                                                
10 The simulation results under the “budget-reduction” scenario are based on the hypothesis that the 
budget reduction will reduce by about 13.2% in 2018. Although it is uncertain how the budget will 
change, this analysis could shed some lights on how the budget reduction will influence the at-risk 
































































































Fig. 6-17. The TBV tenants’ average length-of-time access TBV if the budget cuts are implemented. 
Thirdly, it is hypothesized in the Qualitative Model section that the funding cuts will 
reduce the number of voucher units. After checking the simulation results, I found that 
the administrative fee will be decreased, which means less money will be invested to 
expand the landlord pool. Therefore, the number of “landlord briefing from marketing” 
is expected to decrease. However, because of the word-of-mouth impact is greater than 
the briefing effect, the number of voucher units is not influenced (Fig. 6-18).  
 
 
Fig. 6-18. Changes in the marketing investments if the federal budget cuts are implemented in 2018.  
In conclusion, the federal funding reduction does not have more significant influence on 
the number of HHF than in the “business-as-usual” scenario. However, the reduction 
will negatively affect the TBV tenants.  
7. POLICY DESIGN 


































































































































Currently, in the City of Fort Collins, many agencies have programs dealing with the 
family homelessness issue. As shown in Table 7, the programs were classified based on 
the flows of the HHF stock they are targeted.  
Table 7. Current crisis response system for homeless families in Fort Collins. 
Target flow Assistance Agencies 
EF doubling up Rent assistance Homelessness Prevention Initiative;  
Neighbor to Neighbor (N2N) 
HHF entering shelters Temporary shelters;  
Domestic violence shelters; 
Catholic Charities; 
Crossroads Safehouse 
TBV assisted HHF Section 8 voucher units Housing Catalyst;  
Neighbor to Neighbor (N2N) 
HHF receiving other assistance Public Housing; 
Rapid Re-housing; 
Single room occupancy 
Housing Catalyst; 
Faith Family Hospitality; 
Housing Catalyst 
Source: Homeless Gear in Fort Collins, http://homelessgear.org/ovof/ovof-family-resources/. Note: the 
types of assistance available are included but not limited to those listed in this table.  
Among all the programs, giving them a place to live is proved to be the most cost-
effective (Gubits et al., 2015). As housing policy for low-income households has shifted 
from large-scale public housing developments into vouchers that participants use to find 
housing in the private market, the tenant-based voucher assistance ends up playing a 
vital role in the lives of low-income renters. However, the TBV program did not reach 
its full potential because the lease-up rate among TBV holders is very low in the US. 
This is consistent with our findings that the short of the available vouchers and 
available voucher units restrict the outflow of the HHF stock and are responsible for the 
increase of HHF. 
7.2 Proposed strategies 
There are numerous obstacles to successfully lease-up with a voucher, including 
perceived discrimination, tight rental markets, bureaucratic delays, limited experience 
with the program, household size, health issues (Pashup, Edin, Duncan, & Burke, 2005), 
social networks (Boyd, 2008) and problems with landlords (Boyd, Edin, Clampet-
Lundquist, & Duncan, 2010). Based on the results of this study, I found that the number 
of hidden homeless families is closely related to the number of available vouchers after 
the year of 2016. Therefore, a strategy, increasing available vouchers by raising private 
funds, is proposed. 
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As shown in Fig. 7-1, the desired amount of private funds is determined within the 
system given the targeted number of HHF. A wishful thinking link is added between the 
desired private funding and the inflow of annual private funding incrementing. 
 Fig. 7-1. Strategy structure. 
After implementing this strategy, I found that the number of HHF becomes lower than 
the number in the “business-as-usual” scenario after about a two and half years’ delay. 
Ideally, if there are sufficient private funds and all the families in need apply for TBV 
(“yearly proportion of families apply for TBV” = 1/year), the hidden family 
homelessness will eventually be eliminated in the future (Fig. 7-2). 
              
Fig. 7-2. Effect of the proposed strategy on hidden homeless families. Note: the model simulated to 



































































































































The amount of private funds needed to meet the goal of ending HHF is listed in the 
below table. 
Table 8. Desired private funds and admin. fee needed to meet the goal of ending HHF. 
Year Annual private funding (thousand USD per year) 
Annual Admin fee 
(thousand USD per year) 
Subtotal 
(thousand USD per year) 
2019 1,829 279 2,108 
2020 1,493 214 1,707 
2021 681 99 780 
2022 0 0 0 
2023 0 0 0 
2024 0 0 0 
2025 0 0 0 
2026 189 39 228 
2027 487 116 603 
2028 631 178 809 
2029 521 184 705 
2030 353 151 504 
2031 210 116 326 
2032 90 98 188 
2033 3 107 110 
2034 4 98 102 
2035 5 140 145 
2036 4 160 164 
2037 3 148 151 
2038 3 110 113 
2039 2 72 74 
2040 3 64 67 
2041 4 137 141 
2042 5 155 160 
2043 4 129 133 
2044 2 73 75 
2045 1 32 33 
2046 1 41 42 
2047 3 94 97 
2048 5 150 155 
2049 5 158 163 
Total (Million USD) 9.88 
 
8. DISCUSSION 
The number of homeless families with children has increased alarmingly since the 
1980s. It was estimated that people in families with children representing 35% of the 
total homeless population in the US in 2016 (Henry et al., 2016). For this systematic 
social problem, multiple factors, such as the domestic violence, the rent burden, the 
poverty resulted from the unforeseen financial crisis, and the lack of voucher units, 
have been suggested to be responsible for the family homelessness (Schmitz et al., 
2001). Because of its increasing trend (The state of homelessness in America, 2016), 
there is a growing concern about the vulnerability of the unstable living situation to the 
children and their families (Guarino, Rubin, & Bassuk, 2007). Despite the fact that 
many efforts, such as the subsidy assistance mainly in the form of the HCV, the 
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transitional housing, and the rapid re-housing, have been made in the past years to lift 
these families with children up in the US (Gubits et al., 2015), the family-homelessness 
problem still exists. In the study area of this thesis, the City of Fort Collins, Colorado, 
the one-night PiT count shows the number of literally homeless families increased from 
2016 to 2017 (Kyle, 2017b). This could be attributed to the possibility that there is a 
large amount of families living temporarily in someone else’s residence (The state of 
homelessness in America, 2016). These families are named hidden homeless families 
(HHF), literately means that they are hidden from the public and are insufficiently 
helped, but are very vulnerable to becoming literally homeless (Brush et al., 2016; 
Mihaly, 1991). Without addressing the issue of HHF, it is unlikely to meet the goal of 
eliminating the literally homeless families. In order to allocate appropriate resources to 
help the HHF, I constructed a system dynamics model with the HHF number as the 
stock and the possible associated factors as inflows and outflows, to get a thorough 
understanding about 1) the reasons why the number of hidden homeless families 
increased, 2) how the number of hidden homeless families will change under different 
scenarios that will most probably happen in the near future, and 3) what feasible 
strategies could be suggested to reduce the number. 
8.1 The advantages of System Dynamics approach 
Although many studies have been conducted to raise the public’s awareness of the 
hidden family homelessness (Ahrentzen, 2003; Brush et al., 2016; Mihaly, 1991; Vacha 
& Marin, 1993), most of these studies only presented sort of qualitative models 
showing causal relationships without the actual parameters, functional forms, external 
inputs, and initial conditions needed to fully specify and test the models. System 
Dynamics modeling is an excellent approach for researchers to understand and 
anticipate changes over time in puzzlingly complex systems.  
Sterman (2000) introduced that it is easy for our policies to create unanticipated side 
effects because we tend to hold an event-oriented worldview to interpret experience and 
solve problems. For example, in the homelessness case, it is perceived that people 
receiving government assistance do not work because the safety net and the social 
welfare discourage them from working. Relying on this perception, the Trump 
administration cut hundreds of thousands of vouchers from the Section 8 Program, and 
insisted that people will find jobs and save money to avoid losing their housing. That 
claim, however, is based on a dangerous misunderstanding of who is assisted by these 
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programs. Actually, most of the voucher holders are working or unable to work, and it 
is unlikely for them to increase their income (Pyke, 2017). Instead of saving money for 
the tax payers, the funding cuts would significantly reduce the number of families being 
assisted because it will decrease the capacity of the available vouchers from the section 
8 program, which is facing a severe shortage of resources. To response to the funding 
shortfall and cover as many families as possible, it seems like reducing the subsidy 
standard could be a way. However, the subsidy reduction will increase the tenants’ 
share of their rent and they have to depend on the assistance for a longer time. 
Therefore, it is imperative to have a systematic view of the whole dynamic system and 
make the correct response from the very beginning.  
With SD models, we are able to represent the feedback process, time delays, and 
nonlinearities to determine the dynamics of the system, which could help us to better 
understand how our actions in the real system would affect the at-risk or homeless 
families. Based on the underlying structure, we could obtain a better understanding 
about the sources of policy resistance and design more effective policies. Moreover, 
testing a model constructed using the SD method, which is now one of the most popular 
forms of computer simulation, can speeds and strengthens the learning feedbacks.  
8.2 Estimation of the number of hidden homeless families 
Jay W. Forrest, the founder of System Dynamics, repeatedly emphasized that the first 
task in modeling is to re-create the problem. To recreate the problem of hidden family 
homelessness, we need to understand the magnitude of this problem, i.e. know how big 
the number is. In this study, I used the education data from the Poudre School District 
to estimate the number of hidden homeless families in FC, and use other relevant data 
sources like the caseload of the Matthews House to validate this estimation. However, 
how to properly quantify the number of homeless has historically been a difficult and 
costly venture. It is known that the current PiT count is problematic because not only 
some vulnerable populations, such as the children, are hide from the public view and 
are not taken into account, but also the fact that the PiT count is just a snapshot. The 
amount of homeless, however, is a stock changes over time rather than a static number 
and people often cycle in and out of homelessness. With this in mind, some attempts 
have been made trying to capture more accurate data of this population. For example, 
the current hidden homeless estimation in some communities derived from interviewing 
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households in the Continuum of Care11 (CoC) if a hidden homeless person lived on 
their or their neighbor’s property. Agans et al. (2014) proposed to use neighborhood 
reporting approach as a way to measure hidden homelessness, in which respondents 
were asked to report the number of hidden homeless on their residential property and 
any hidden homeless on their neighbor’s property. Hunter (2016) suggest that the PiT 
counts should be complemented by other information gathering approaches, such as 
period prevalence counts, which collect administrative data over the course of a year, or 
the creation of a by-name list, a real-time registry of people who enter and exit 
homelessness within a community.  
In the study area of FC, data collection is now considered as one of the biggest issues 
concerning the homeless problem. The Director of the Social Sustainability in FC said 
even though the rate of homelessness in Fort Collins has been relatively stable, current 
data gathering resources are not as robust for decision making. By partnering with the 
Housing First Initiative and Homeward 2020 Programs, the FC seeks to gather 
appropriate data for its Ten-Year Plan, which seeks to “make homelessness rare, short-
lived and non-recurring”, and direct its limited resources in the most impactful place. 
Collaboration with others like the Poudre School District's McKinney-Vento liaisons 
are also focused on to identify the homeless students.  
8.3 The reasons why the number of hidden homeless families increased. 
Several studies have been conducted to figure out either the reasons why the families 
doubling-up or what assistances could help them out (Agans et al., 2014; Ahrentzen, 
2003; Gould & Williams, 2010; Gubits et al., 2015; Hartman & Robinson, 2003; Rog & 
Buckner, 2007; Sard, 2001; M Shinn, 2009; Turner, 1998; Vacha & Marin, 1993). 
However, most of them are just qualitative studies. I argue that can we reduce its 
number only if we have a clear mind about the process of families becoming doubled-
up and allocate enough resources to help the hidden homeless families based on the 
underlying reasons. Therefore, having quantitative figures about both the inflows and 
outflows are critical.  
                                                
11 The CoC Program is designed to assist individuals (including unaccompanied youth) and families 
experiencing homelessness and to provide the services needed to help such individuals move into 




This study setup a model with the number of hidden homeless families as a stock by 
applying the theory of stocks and flows in the field of system dynamics, and explored 
the effects of the addition of inflows and subtraction of outflows of this stock. The 
behavior showed that the total inflow into the stock was larger than the total outflow 
from the stock, which is the reason why the number of hidden homeless families 
increased over the past years. Specifically, the number of evicted families doubling-up 
due to the rental cost-burden was larger than the number of HHF receiving assistances. 
It also suggested that the insufficient capacity of the TBV program first in the form of 
the voucher unit vacancy and then in the form of available vouchers is the main reason 
why the outflow was smaller than the inflow.  
8.4 The change of the number of hidden homeless families in the future 
In order to allocate sufficient resources to help the hidden homeless families, we need 
to understand how such population size will change in the near future.  
The model analyzed the number of hidden homeless families under two scenarios: 1) 
the “Business-as-usual” scenario, and 2) the “funding-reduction” scenario. First, under 
the “Business-as-usual” scenario, it was estimated that, without additional strategies, 
the amount of the hidden homeless families will increase as a result of the bigger total 
inflow than the total outflow. Second, the federal budget cuts will not have a big 
difference on the number of HHF, however, the funding shortfall would result in a 
decreased subsidy to the tenants that are receiving vouchers. These findings could be 
helpful for local authorities and homelessness charities for addressing the family 
homeless issue.  
8.5 The feasible solutions to address the hidden family homelessness 
Despite the expected increasing trend of HHF, they still have not received enough 
attention. Even the HUD’s definition of homeless does not count them as homeless. 
Therefore, conceptual changes are firstly needed if we want to end the hidden family 
homelessness. It is suggested that including the HHF in the PiT count can help to shed 
some lights on who is experiencing homelessness that was hidden from the public 
attention and what services are needed to help them (Brush et al., 2016). According to 
the analysis of this study, it is obvious that any policies either targeting the inflows or 
the outflows could have an impact on the stock of HHF. However, if the policy is 
insufficient to make the outflow larger than the inflow, the stock will keep increasing 
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and the problem will not be successfully addressed. Based on the simulation results, it 
is critical to increase the capacity of the assistance programs, mainly in the form of 
available vouchers, in order to make the outflow larger than the inflow. Although the 
federal funds are expected to decrease, the number of available vouchers could be 
increased by raising private funds or other resources. 
8.6 Policy Implications 
Children are the future of the world. Experiencing vulnerable situation in their 
childhood could have long-term negative impacts on their life when they transition to 
adulthood (Guarino et al., 2007). This problem will also result in a lot of costs for the 
society. Preventing children and their families from experiencing homelessness should 
be prioritized and can enhance the quality of their life. 
Although the proposed strategy seems to work in the model, the strategy might be too 
simplistic relative to the real setting. The potential for misperceptions to influence 
model building, stock estimates, judgements of results, etc., implies that a minimum of 
dialogue between policy makers, the homeless, landlords, agency managers, sociologist 
and statisticians should be institutionalized. The model presented in this study could 
serve as a tool to initiate the engagement of the stakeholders, and get them involved in 
the family homelessness system.  
8.7 Limitations and future work 
The aim of this study is to advance the policy discussion, not to resolve it completely, 
and there remain many questions about the underlying reasons for misperceptions and 
about policy design. Firstly, the family homeless is a complex issue and is related to 
social issues like the poverty, welfare, equality, human rights, among others. This study 
only focused on the economic issue while other reasons leading to family homelessness 
are excluded. To eliminate the problem, we need to expand the boundary to cover these 
social issues as well. Secondly, birth, deaths and migration are excluded in this study. 
Previous research has indicated that the immigrant population lives to a higher extent in 
rented housing, in less attractive neighborhoods and in more overcrowded conditions. 
Immigrant is also thought to be closely associated with the increase of the hidden 
homeless families. Therefore, further studies need to take population growth into 
consideration. Thirdly, some of the parameters in this model were arbitrarily assigned to 
certain values when first-hand data are not available. Therefore, the simulated behavior 
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presented in this thesis might be different when more precise values of these parameters 
were available and applied in the model. Fourthly, although the policy model suggested 
that increasing vouchers by raising private funds is critical to address the problem, the 
cost-effectiveness analysis is not completed in this study and the real challenge is to 
think about how to implement the suggested strategy. Finally, for most families, 
housing assistance alone is not enough to recover from homelessness and achieve self-
sufficiency. Policies focusing on long-term family stability are critical. 
9. CONCLUSION 
By focusing on the hidden homeless families, this study modelled the processes of 
families being at-risk, becoming homeless, and being assisted by the tenant-based 
housing choice vouchers. The model behaves as expected from the real world 
observations.  
By the system dynamics modelling, this study shed lights into multiple aspects of the 
family homeless system: 1) the rental cost-burden contributed to families becoming at-
risk and will increase the number in the future, 2) the tenant-based vouchers play a vital 
role in preventing the at-risk families from becoming homeless and moving the 
homeless families out of the unstable situation, but the assistance capacity is 
insufficient to keep pace with the demand, that is the reason why the at-risk or homeless 
families increased and will keep increasing in the future, 3) the capacity of tenant-based 
vouchers was limited by the number of voucher units but will mainly constrained by the 
number of available vouchers which is fundamentally the funding availability.  
Overall, the modelling results of this study showed us that housing vouchers are of 
great help to the homeless families, and future policies should focus on increasing more 
funds to make more vouchers available. The system dynamics model and the results 
presented in this study could be a useful tool to estimate the demand of housing 
vouchers and engage the stakeholders in the family homelessness system during the 
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Table 9. Parameters and their values used to keep the model in equilibrium.  
Note: parameters not listed in the table are the same as the original setting. 
Parameters Value Units 








EQ initial CBF 3000 Family 


















EQ initial VT 1700 Family 
EQ yrly. prop of CBF with other assistance 0.0306415160763 1/year 
EQ yrly. prop of EF with other assistance 0.4 1/year 
EQ yrly. prop of HHF with other assistance 0.0325 1/year 
EQ yrly. prop of LHF with other assistance 0.23333333 1/year 
EQ CBF/EF/HHF/LHF allocation rate 0.25 unitless 
EQ initial families on waitlist 784.4444444 Family 
EQ initial eligible applicants 280.158730159 Family 
EQ initial TBV  
 
1980.15873016  Vouchers 
EQ initial PL 4000 Landlord 
EQ yrly. landlord increasing rate 0.0552854582693 1/year 
EQ initial briefed landlords 600 Landlord 
EQ yrly. proportion of participation from briefing 0.342763270183 1/year 
EQ initial LP 1600 Landlord 
EQ yrly. proportion of LP withdrawing 0.138213645673 1/year 





EQ admin fee reserves  
 
990,079.365079 USD 
EQ renewal funding inflation 0 unitless 
EQ inflation adjusted monthly median income 2500 USD/family/month 
EQ fair market rent 1000 USD/family/month 
